The Case for Extending Pretrial Diversion to Include Possession of Child Pornography by Long, Sarah J.
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 2 Trends and Issues in Veterans & the Law Article 4
January 2014
The Case for Extending Pretrial Diversion to
Include Possession of Child Pornography
Sarah J. Long
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Juveniles Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.
Recommended Citation
Long, Sarah J. (2014) "The Case for Extending Pretrial Diversion to Include Possession of Child Pornography," University of
Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol9/iss2/4
  306
The Case for Extending Pretrial Diversion 
to Include Possession of Child Pornography 
Sarah J. Long 
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ABSTRACT 
Pretrial diversion removes offenders with a low-risk of reoffending from the penal 
system and instead sends them to supervised treatment programs. The result is lower 
cost to the state and a second chance for those who successfully complete the 
program. 
Typically, violent crimes, such as murder and attempted murder, are exempt from 
pretrial diversion. Notably, sex related crimes are also ineligible in all jurisdictions. 
By excluding all sex-related crimes from pretrial diversion, possession of child 
pornography is adjudicated by the courts. As a result, young, first-time offenders 
who may be candidates for treatment are bundled with physical offenders, members 
of child pornography “circles,” and rapists, charged as felons, and faced with fifteen 
years as a registered sex offender. 
While this may make the public feel safe, it eliminates an option for those who could 
truly benefit from pretrial diversion. By offering pretrial diversion for “simple” 
possession of child pornography, offenders who are unlikely to reoffend or to 
escalate their actions will receive necessary treatment, making it more likely that 
they move forward and become productive law abiding citizens. 
AUTHOR 
Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Massachusetts School of Law, 2014; BEng. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
retrial diversion moves certain offenders who meet strict criteria 
out of the mainstream criminal justice system and allows them to 
participate in treatment programs that have been preapproved by the 
jurisdiction.1 Those who successfully complete the treatment program, 
and meet other conditions, effectively have their criminal charges 
dismissed.2 Pretrial diversion has been available to qualifying adult 
offenders since the late 1960s3 and has proven to be both successful4 
and cost effective.5 
Those charged with possession of child pornography are generally 
not eligible for pretrial diversion.6 They should be. By bundling 
possession of child pornography with the broad category of criminal 
sex offenses, jurisdictions are forfeiting an opportunity to divert and 
treat non-physical offenders who have no criminal record and who 
may benefit from treatment. Without this opportunity, those convicted 
                                                 
 
1 See generally, Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES 1, 9 (2006), http://www.pretrial.org/document-
search-results/?wpfb_s=promising&search=Search. 
2 Id. 
3 John P. Bellassai, A Short History of the Pretrial Diversion of Adult Defendants 
from Traditional Criminal Justice Processing Part One: The Early Years, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, 1, 2, www.napsa.org/publications
/diversionhistory.pdf. 
4 See Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 16 (referencing 
survey response indicating eighty-five percent “successful program completion 
rate”); and Thomas E. Ulrich, PreTrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, 
66 FED. PROBATION 33, 5–6 (2002) (noting “satisfactory disposition was 
achieved in eighty-eight percent of the cases”). 
5 See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Prosecution Backs Alternative to Prison for Drug 
Addicts, 19 CRIM. JUST. 2, 2 (Summer 2004) (thirty-eight percent savings per 
inmate per year in New York); Kate Cahoy et. al., SB114: Improving Pretrial 
Diversion to Meet the Unique Needs of Connecticut’s Veterans, YALE LAW 
SCHOOL, 6–8 (February 2012), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics
/SB114White_Paper.pdf (sixty-four percent estimated savings per day in 
Connecticut). 
6 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-696 (2009) (referencing list of offenses 
inapplicable for pretrial probation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276A, § 4 (2012) 
(same); Diversion Guidelines, OFFICE OF DIST. ATT’Y, 18TH JUDIC. DIST. OF 
KAN., available at http://www.sedgwickcounty.org/da/documents/CR%20
Diversion%20Form%20.pdf (excluding all sex offenses from consideration for 
pretrial diversion). 
P 
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of possessing child pornography may be charged with a felony, face 
incarceration, and be required to register as a sex offender for up to 
fifteen years upon release.7 
This Note recommends pretrial diversion as an option for those 
charged with possession of child pornography who meet a strict set of 
guidelines. This Note does not address the seriousness of the crime of 
possession of child pornography, nor does it discuss the effect that 
child pornography has on those depicted. Those debates are emotional, 
highly charged, and continue to be broadly discussed.8 Further, 
addressing those issues would be as helpful to the context of the 
argument as discussing whether drug use and possession are serious 
crimes that victimize others. This Note solely focuses on the 
advantages pretrial diversion provides to the state and to those 
offenders who meet a strict set of guidelines. 
Part II of this Note reviews the evolution of pretrial probation from 
a federal experiment in New York to widespread use throughout the 
country. Part III discusses a brief history of the law and sentencing for 
the crime of possession of child pornography. Part IV then argues that 
extending the already narrowly tailored pretrial diversion option to 
include those charged with possession of child pornography will be in 
line with two of the primary goals of pretrial diversion—providing 
second chances to those who qualify and saving the state money. The 
                                                 
 
7 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2012) (setting punishment for possession of child 
pornography); 42 U.S.C. § 16915(A) (2012) (providing the sex offender 
registration requirements); see also Stephanie Buntin, The High Price of 
Misguided Legislation: Nevada’s Need for Practical Sex Offender Laws, 11 
NEV. L.J. 771 (2011) (discussing Nevada’s sex offender laws). 
8 Compare Ashleigh B. Boe, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring 
Defendants Who Possess Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child 
Pornography Victims, 86 N.D. L. REV. 205 (2010) (recommending child 
pornography possession offenders compensate those depicted in the images), 
and Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 
847 (2008) (supporting the theory that each time an image is viewed, more harm 
is done to the person depicted), with Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making the 
Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for 
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16, RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8 
(2010) (recommending a more practical approach to sentencing for possession 
of child pornography), and Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child 
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 545, 571–72 (2011) (noting that judges rarely find it useful to 
consider that revictimization occurs when child pornography is viewed). 
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argument proposes that allowing pretrial diversion for those who 
qualify will not put the public at increased risk of these offenders and 
in fact, will likely result in decreased instances of reoffending. 
II. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF PRETRIAL PROBATION 
A. Initial Focus on Juvenile Offenders 
Conrad P. Printzlien is credited with creating the first pretrial 
diversion program.9 Printzlien left his former position in the United 
States Attorney’s Office to become the second United States Probation 
Officer for the Eastern District of New York.10 Printzlien went on to 
create a unique program for juvenile offenders.11 In describing the 
experiment, later referred to as the Brooklyn Plan, Printzlien remarked, 
“[t]here is a step ahead: an effort to eliminate legal procedure, in the 
technical sense. Whatever legal procedure is invoked, no matter how 
efficiently it is carried through, nor with what intelligence and humane 
insight it is administered, it always leaves an indelible mark—a 
record.”12 Printzlien posited, “[w]hy not . . .conduct an investigation 
prior to prosecution to determine whether or not prosecution in the 
first instance was warranted or necessary?”13 
To answer that question, Printzlien approached the United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York and offered the services 
of the probation office to implement that very investigation program.14 
In short, the probation department would: 
[c]onduct an investigation of the juvenile’s background prior to 
then after prosecution. In the event that the investigation of a 
youthful offender indicated a substantial background, good home 
influences, no previous convictions, then on the strength of the 
preliminary report, coupled with the information submitted by the 
                                                 
 
9 Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, The “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A. 
Deferred Prosecution, 60 FED. PROBATION 8 (1996). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Conrad P. Printzlien, Deferred Prosecution: Provisional Release of Juvenile 
Delinquents, 7 FED. B.J. 278 (1946) (grammar and punctuation in original). 
13 Id. at 279. 
14 Id. 
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investigating agencies of the government, a determination could be 
made not to prosecute.15 
The Brooklyn Plan was fine-tuned over seven years and resulted in 
an endorsement by United States Attorney General Tom Clarke, who 
recommended its use by all United States attorneys in 1946.16 
Pretrial diversion remained focused on juvenile offenders and 
operated throughout the country without procedural or statutory 
authority until 1964, when the Department of Justice formalized the 
use of deferred prosecution in an official memorandum.17 
Interestingly, while the memorandum explicitly reserved deferred 
prosecution for juveniles, the results of a questionnaire issued by the 
United States Department of Justice as part of a formalization effort 
indicated that forty-eight percent of all individuals receiving deferred 
prosecution supervision were adults.18 
B. Broader Acceptance 
By 1967, several states had enacted legislation modeled after the 
Brooklyn Plan and the federal memorandum.19 More importantly, that 
year the Report on the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
& Administration of Justice (Presidential Report) was released.20 The 
340-page document commissioned by Lyndon B. Johnson made “more 
than 200 specific recommendations—concrete steps the Commission 
[believed could] lead to a safer and more just society.”21 Among them, 
“[e]arly identification and diversion to other community resources of 
those offenders in need of treatment, for whom full criminal 
                                                 
 
15 Id. 
16 Rackmill, supra note 9, at 10. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 12. 
19 Bellassai, supra note 3, at 2 (citing Connecticut, Illinois, and New York 
legislation). 
20 Id. 
21 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE V (1967). 
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disposition [did] not appear required.”22 The recommendations were 
not limited to simply juvenile offenders.23 
The Presidential Report, in some respects, legitimized what may 
have been considered experiments in pretrial diversion. In the 1970s, 
both the number of state jurisdictions adopting pretrial diversion 
legislation, as well as institutional recognition, increased.24 Notably, 
the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment was 
released and included a section on pretrial diversion.25 
C. Pretrial Diversion Today 
Today, pretrial diversion programs exist under federal law, under 
state law in forty-five states, in the District of Columbia, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.26 Pretrial diversion programs in general involve two 
hurdles which offenders must overcome in order to be considered.  
First, offenders must comply with a “risk and needs assessment.”27 
Conditions are predetermined by jurisdiction and are based upon 
factors such as the type of offense and the criminal history of the 
offender. For example, by statute, Kansas provides a minimum list of 
factors that must be considered before an offender may be admitted 
into a pretrial diversion program.28 In addition to considering such 
                                                 
 
22 Id. at 134. 
23 Id. 
24 Bellassai, supra note 3, at 6. 
25 Id. at 7 (referencing the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
§ 320.5 (1975)). 
26 Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 9. 
27 Id. at 1. 
28 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2908 (2012). The minimum factors are: 
 “(1) The nature of the crime charged and the circumstances 
surrounding it; (2) any special characteristics or circumstances of 
the defendant; (3) whether the defendant is a first-time offender 
and if the defendant has previously participated in diversion, 
according to the certification of the Kansas bureau of investigation 
or the division of vehicles of the department of revenue; (4) 
whether there is a probability that the defendant will cooperate 
with and benefit from diversion; (5) whether the available 
diversion program is appropriate to the needs of the defendant; (6) 
the impact of the diversion of the defendant upon the community; 
(7) recommendations, if any, of the involved law enforcement 
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factors as the nature and circumstances of the crime, likelihood to 
reoffend, and whether the offender has any prior convictions, 
acceptance into a pretrial diversion program may require victim 
notification and approval, restitution by the offender, and a 
psychological assessment of the offender.29 
The second hurdle which an offender must overcome in a pretrial 
diversion program is to accept and follow the conditions for release.30 
Again, such conditions are generally predicated by the offense and 
include requirements such as attendance at a state recognized 
treatment or counseling program, community service, restitution, and 
regular urinalysis testing.31 Throughout the program, the offender is 
generally supervised by the probation department or its equivalent.32 
Offenders who are granted pretrial diversion but fail to meet the terms 
of his or her diversion agreement are either given increased pretrial 
sanctions or are removed from the program and reentered into the 
courts for adjudication on the original charge.33 
D. Does it Work? 
There are two primary considerations when addressing whether 
pretrial diversion is effective. The first is the overall success of the 
program as an alternative to incarceration. The second is the cost 
savings to the jurisdiction implementing the program. 
A recent nationwide survey demonstrated an eighty-five percent 
successful program completion rate for those who are accepted into a 
                                                                                                                   
 
agency; (8) recommendations, if any, of the victim; (9) provisions 
for restitution; and (10) any mitigating circumstances. 
 Id. 
29 See id.; see also A Guide to Special Sessions & Diversionary Programs in 
Connecticut, JDP-CR-137 (2012) http://jud.ct.gov/Publications/CR137P.pdf 
(providing similar requirements used in Connecticut). 
30 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 320.5(d) (1975) 
(defining rehabilitation as one of the conditions to which the prosecution and the 
accused may agree); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS 
OF GUILTY 11–12 (American Bar Association ed., 3rd ed. 1999) (recommending 
diversion agreements be in writing). 
31 Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 13. 
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pretrial diversion program.34 On the federal level, a detailed analysis of 
the pretrial diversion program demonstrated an eighty-eight percent 
“satisfactory disposition” rate.35 While different programs have 
different results,36 the overall view of pretrial probation is that, for 
those who meet the qualifications, it is a viable, useful alternative to 
incarceration.37 
Providing an alternative to incarceration benefits not only the 
offender but the government as well. The prosecution saves resources, 
time, and money on pre-trial and trial preparation.38 The Court saves 
resources and the docket is cleared for more serious cases.39 While the 
cost of treatment is higher for diversionary cases, the costs of 
incarceration and probation may be reduced.40 An example of the 
savings can be seen in a report prepared for the New York State 
Unified Court System, which calculated an average savings of $5,564 
per participant in state-wide drug courts.41 The report focused on 
judicial diversion, which takes place later in the adjudication cycle and 
therefore does not include savings recognized for programs that divert 
                                                 
 
34 Id. at 16. Success as measured in the survey used for this report predominantly 
included completing the program. Many jurisdictions included in the survey did 
not maintain recidivism information. Id. 
35 Thomas E. Ulrich, PreTrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, 66 FED. 
PROBATION 33, 33 (2002). 
36 See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Prosecution Backs Alternative to Prison for Addicts, 
19 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 27 (citing a 2003 report showing over fifty-
two percent of 1,000 participants enrolled in the Drug Treatment Alternative-to-
Prison program since the year 2000 “graduated”). 
37 See Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 16. See also No 
Entry: A National Survey of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs and 
Initiatives, CENTER FOR HEALTH AND JUSTICE AT TASC, 1, 17 (Dec., 2013), 
http://www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/sites/www2.centerforhealthandjustice
.org/files/publications/CHJ%20Diversion%20Report_web.pdf. 
38 See Printzlien, supra note 13, at 285. 
39 Id. 
40 NPC Research and Center for Court Innovation, Testing the Cost Savings of 
Judicial Diversion, 1, 40 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pretrial.org/wp-content
/uploads/filebase/diversion/Testing%20the%20Cost%20Savings%20of%20%
20Judicial%20Diversion%20-%20Center%20for%20Court%20Innovation%20
et%20al%202013.pdf (focusing on drug courts and judicial diversion). 
41 Id. at 39. 
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participants earlier in the process.42 The savings from other programs, 
therefore, should be even greater. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION AND 
SENTENCING 
A. Obscenity and the Supreme Court 
Before discussing the evolution of child pornography legislation, it 
is important to understand two seminal Supreme Court cases dealing 
with obscenity: Roth v. United States43 and Stanley v. Georgia.44 
Roth involved two consolidated cases each with defendants in the 
business of selling books, magazines, and other materials.45 The 
defendants solicited business through flyers and circulars.46 Samuel 
Roth, resident of New York, had been convicted for violating the 
federal obscenity statute.47 David Alberts, resident of California, had 
been convicted for violating the California Penal Code.48 The ultimate 
issue in both cases was whether obscene speech was protected under 
the First Amendment.49 In holding that obscene speech was not 
protected, the court stated: 
[a]lthough this is the first time the question has been squarely 
presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous 
opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity 
is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.50 
                                                 
 
42 Id. at 3. 
43 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
44 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
45 Roth, 354 U.S. at 479–81. 
46 Id. at 480–81. 
47 Id. at 480. 
48 Id. at 481. 
49 Id. at 479. The issue in David Albert’s case was under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because of his conviction under state law. Id. While the Court 
addressed each conviction in turn, the focus of the case is whether obscene 
speech enjoys Constitutional protections. Id. at 481, 492-494. 
50 Id. at 481 (internal citations omitted). 
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This was the first broad decision by the Court confirming that 
obscenity was not protected speech and thus state and federal laws 
restricting or outlawing it were not unconstitutional.51 
Twelve years after Roth, the Court considered another obscenity 
case in Stanley v. Georgia.52 In Stanley, federal and state police had 
secured a search warrant to investigate bookmaking activities at the 
defendant’s home.53 While executing the warrant, the police came 
upon material they deemed to be obscene. Stanley was convicted of 
violating Georgia state law for “knowingly hav(ing) possession of . . . 
obscene matter.”54 
In overturning the defendant’s conviction, the Court distinguished 
the case from Roth, emphasizing the fact that Stanley’s conviction had 
been for the private possession of the material: 
[n]one of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the 
proposition that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is 
not protected by the freedoms of speech and press’ were made in 
the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of 
obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part with use of 
the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of 
public distribution or dissemination. Moreover, none of this 
Court’s decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for 
private possession of obscene materials.55 
Hence, Roth was not overruled, but rather an exception was carved 
out which allowed “the States [to] retain broad power to regulate 
obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by 
the individual in the privacy of his own home.”56 
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority in Stanley, and 
has been lauded for the manner in which he addressed privacy rights in 
                                                 
 
51 Prior to Roth the Supreme Court had not ruled on the definition of obscenity or 
whether it was protected by the First Amendment. Donovan W. Gaede, 
Comment, Constitutional Law—Policing the Obscene: Modern Obscenity 
Doctrine Re-Evaluated, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439, 441 (1994). 
52 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
53 Id. at 558. 
54 Id. at 558–59. 
55 Id. at 560–61 (emphasis added). 
56 Id. at 568. 
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light of the First Amendment in his holding.57 In Stanley, Justice 
Marshall notably stated: 
[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has 
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what 
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole 
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government 
the power to control men’s minds.58 
The pendulum favoring First Amendment rights would soon swing 
back. 
B. Child Pornography Legislation 
Before 1977, fewer than six states had enacted statutes prohibiting 
child pornography59 and there were no such statutes at the federal 
level.60 By 2011, every state had enacted child pornography laws and 
Congress had enacted and amended legislation multiple times, often in 
rapid response to Supreme Court decisions.61 
The states were the first to become aware of the lack of legislation 
regarding child pornography.62 As the use of children to create 
pornography increased, the interstate nature of the resulting videos and 
images also increased.63 Faced with few resources and a growing 
problem, the states pressured Congress for federal involvement.64 
Congress responded and, in 1977, The Protection of Children Against 
                                                 
 
57 See, e.g., J. Clay Smith, Jr. & Scott Burrell, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the 
First Amendment, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 461, 464 (1994) (noting, inter alia, that a 
recent tribute to Marshall by the members of the Bar of the Supreme Court 
included his stand in the Stanley case). 
58 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
59 Todd J. Weiss, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the 
First Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 331 (1985) (citing S. REP. NO. 
95–438, at 10 (1977) (finding six states had proscribed the use of children in 
pornographic material)); Jennifer M. Payton, Note, Child Pornography 
Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 519–20 (1978–1979) (finding one state had a 
statute proscribing the same). 
60 See Payton, supra note 59, at 511. 
61 State Statutes—Child Pornography Possession, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS. ASS’N, 
(Mar. 2010), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Child%20Pornography%20Possession
%20Statutes%203-2010.pdf. 
62 Weiss, supra note 59, at 332. 
63 See id. at 332–33. 
64 Id. at 333. 
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Sexual Exploitation Act was signed into law.65 “[P]remising its 
jurisdiction over such activity as an extension of its command over 
interstate commerce,”66 the federal statute barred the use of children in 
the production of pornography.67 
The definition of obscenity was a barrier to the enforcement of the 
federal statute and to a rapidly increasing number of state laws 
proscribing child pornography.68 In 1973, the Supreme Court 
announced a legal definition of “obscenity” which hampered 
prosecution under the federal statute and state equivalents.69 Miller v. 
California70 was one of a family of pornography cases the Court 
decided together.71 The holding in Miller, enunciated by Justice 
Berger, stated: 
In sum, we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is 
not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material 
can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific safeguards 
enunciated above, without a showing that the material is ‘utterly 
without redeeming social value’; and (c) hold that obscenity is to 
be determined by applying ‘contemporary community 
standards,’ . . . not ‘national standards.’72 
By focusing the definition of “obscenity” on “contemporary 
community standards,” it was difficult to establish a uniform manner 
in which to enforce the federal and state child pornography statutes.73 
In 1982, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of child 
pornography in New York v. Ferber.74 Ferber involved a New York 
statute “prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a sexual 
performance by a child under the age of sixteen by distributing 
material which depicted such a performance,”75 Ferber, a bookstore 
                                                 
 
65 Id. at 333 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253). 
66 Id. at 334–335. 
67 See generally id. 
68 Weiss, supra note 59, at 336. 
69 Id. 
70 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 36–37 (citations omitted). 
73 See Weiss, supra note 59, at 336. 
74 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
75 Id. at 747. 
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owner, was convicted of violating the statute when he sold films 
showing boys masturbating.76 Ferber’s argument, inter alia, was that 
the films were protected speech under Miller.77 In upholding the 
constitutionality of the New York statute, the Court noted: 
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity 
standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it for the 
purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in the 
following respects: A trier of fact need not find that the material 
appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not 
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently 
offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered 
as a whole. We note that the distribution of descriptions or other 
depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not 
involve live performance or photographic or other visual 
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment 
protection.78 
While Ferber did not specifically provide a legal definition for child 
pornography, it provided guidelines which encouraged Congress to 
revisit its earlier legislation proscribing child pornography.79 The 
ultimate result was the Child Protection Act of 1984 (CPA).80 
The Child Protection Act of 1984 amended the 1977 Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in several significant ways. 
First, the CPA removed references to “obscenity” that had hindered 
enforcement under the Miller standard.81 Second, the requirement that 
the images be created for commercial purposes was removed.82 Third, 
a new offense was created for “knowingly reproducing any visual 
depiction of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct through the 
mails.”83 Fourth, the age under which a child would be protected was 
                                                 
 
76 See generally id. 
77 See generally id. 
78 Id. at 764–65 (citations omitted). 
79 Weiss, supra note 59, at 342. 
80 Id. Weiss offers a detailed discussion of the path from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ferber to the signing of the Child Protection Act by President 
Reagan. Id. at 342–48. 
81 Annemarie J. Mazzone, Comment, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children 
From Sexual Exploitation Through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA. & ENT. L.J. 167, 185 (1994). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 185–86. 
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increased from sixteen to eighteen.84 Additionally, Congress replaced 
the word “lewd,” which had been associated with the Miller obscenity 
standard, with “lascivious.”85 
Because of the difficulty in establishing a link between private 
possession and interstate commerce, it is noteworthy that the federal 
proscription of child pornography did not apply to privately owned 
images or items otherwise prohibited by the statute. In other words, 
possession of images of child pornography was not implicated in the 
federal statute.86 States, however, were not necessarily so restricted.87 
Several states enacted laws prohibiting private possession of child 
pornography and by 1990 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to 
address the issue in Osborne v. Ohio.88 
Osborne involved an Ohio statute that prohibited the possession of 
nude photographs of children.89 Osborne was convicted of violating 
this statute after police seized four illegal images from his home. He 
appealed his conviction on First Amendment grounds.90 In order to 
hold that the Ohio statute did not violate the First Amendment, the 
Court had to distinguish the case from Stanley.91 To do so, the Court 
focused on the intent of the laws in question, noting that while Stanley 
“sought to proscribe possession of obscenity because [the Georgia law 
in question] was concerned that obscenity would poison the mind of its 
viewers,” the intent of the Ohio law in question in Osborne was “to 
protect the victims of child pornography [and] destroy a market for the 
exploitative use of children.”92 
Having disposed of the Stanley precedent, the Court applied strict 
scrutiny and found that: 
                                                 
 
84 Id. at 186. Literally, the statute reduced the age from “under sixteen” to “under 
eighteen.” Id.  
85 Id. at 187. Additionally, in 1988 during the nascent years of computers, 
Congress amended the federal child pornography statute by prohibiting the use 
of computers to “transport, distribute, or receive” child pornography. Id. 
86 Id. at 187. 
87 Mazzone, supra note 81. 
88 Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)). 
89 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Anderson Supp.1990). 
90 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
91 Id. at 109–10. See also supra III.B. 
92 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (internal citations omitted). 
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[i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest 
in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor’ is ‘compelling.’. . . The legislative judgment, as well as the 
judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as 
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, 
emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, 
easily passes muster under the First Amendment. It is also surely 
reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the 
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess 
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.93 
Again freed from First Amendment fetters, Congress amended the 
federal child pornography laws.94 In a 1990 amendment, Congress 
added the offense of possession of child pornography.95 
The next major change to the federal pornography laws occurred in 
1996.96 Concerned by the ease with which images could be 
manipulated with computer technology, Congress passed the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.97 The 1996 amendment 
extended the definition of child pornography to include “virtual child 
pornography.”98 Virtual child pornography is child pornography that 
has not been created with real children.99 
The 1996 extension of the federal law was challenged on First 
Amendment grounds and was heard by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coalition.100 In a 6–3 opinion, the Court held: 
By prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an actual 
child, the statute goes beyond New York v. Ferber, which 
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit 
speech because of the State’s interest in protecting the children 
                                                 
 
93 Id. at 109–10 (internal citations omitted). 
94 See Mazzone, supra note 81, at 191. 
95 Id. 
96 John Schwartz, New Law Expanding Legal Definition of Child Pornography 
Draws Fire, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1996, at A10. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2007). Virtual child 
pornography may be created, for example, with actors digitally manipulated to 
look like children or by using animation. Id. 
100 See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (presenting a 
case challenging the virtual child pornography statute). 
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exploited by the production process. As a general rule, 
pornography can be banned only if obscene, but under Ferber, 
pornography showing minors can be proscribed whether or not the 
images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller v. 
California. Ferber recognized that ‘[t]he Miller standard, like all 
general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not 
reflect the State’s particular and more compelling interest in 
prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of 
children.’101 
Again, Congress responded, this time enacting the Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Act of 
2003 (the PROTECT Act).102 This act created a new crime for 
“pandering or soliciting material” which “reflects the belief, or that is 
intended to cause another to believe that it contains child 
pornography.”103 Not unexpectedly, this law, too, made it to the 
Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds in United States v. 
Williams, where it was challenged as being overbroad and vague.104 In 
upholding the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, the Court 
observed that the determination called for was fact-based, stating: 
The statute requires that the defendant hold, and make a statement 
that reflects, the belief that the material is child pornography; or 
that he communicate in a manner intended to cause another so to 
believe. Those are clear questions of fact . . . To be sure, it may be 
difficult in some cases to determine whether these clear 
requirements have been met. ‘But courts and juries every day pass 
upon knowledge, belief and intent—the state of men’s minds—
having before them no more than evidence of their words and 
conduct, from which, in ordinary human experience, mental 
condition may be inferred.’ 105 
 The Court ended its decision with the following observation: 
                                                 
 
101 Id. at 240 (citations omitted). 
102 Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of 
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 23 (2011). Several other laws were passed at this time 
dealing with child pornography and abuse. Their relevance to this Note is not 
material so they are not addressed. 
103 See id. at 25 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)). 
104 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
105 Id. at 306. 
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Child pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our 
citizens. Both the State and Federal Governments have sought to 
suppress it for many years, only to find it proliferating through the 
new medium of the Internet. This Court held unconstitutional 
Congress’s previous attempt to meet this new threat, and Congress 
responded with a carefully crafted attempt to eliminate the First 
Amendment problems we identified. As far as the provision at 
issue in this case is concerned, that effort was successful.106 
Congress’ authority, of course, extends beyond statutes defining 
federal crimes. Congress also sets penalties for violating those statutes. 
C. Child Pornography Sentencing 
As Congress amended the federal child pornography statutes, it 
also increased the penalties for violation107 by increasing the minimum 
and maximum penalties for the offenses associated with child 
pornography.108 Importantly, sentence-enhancements were added 
which increased penalties based upon the details of the offense.109 For 
example, the number of images possessed and the age of the children 
depicted results in a sentence-enhancement.110 Interestingly, using a 
                                                 
 
106 Id. at 307. 
107 Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: 
Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 552 
(2011). 
108 Id. at 552. 
109 See generally Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A 
Primer on the Flawed Progression of Child Pornography Guidelines, OFFICE OF 
DEFENDER SERVS. (2009), http://www.fd.org/docs/Select-Topics—-sentencing
/child-porn-july-revision.pdf. 
110 Id. at 26.  
Base Offense Level: (a)(1): 18 if a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1466A(b) or § 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5)(a)(2): 22 otherwise; 
BUT If (a)(2), + conduct was limited to receipt or solicitation, + no 
intent to traffic or distribute, then -2. Specific Characteristics: 
(b)(1) prepubescent or a minor under 12 years +2; (b)(2) if 
distribution A) For pecuniary gain, see 2B1.1, but not less than +5; 
B) For value but not pecuniary gain +5; C) To a minor +5; D) To a 
minor to persuade the minor to engage in illegal activity other than 
E) +6; E) To persuade a minor to engage in sexual conduct +7; F) 
Other than for the reasons above +2; (b)(3) if material portrays 
sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other violence, +4; (b)(4) 
Pattern of Abuse +5; (b)(5) transmission of material or notice by 
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computer to access pornography increases the sentence that may be 
imposed.111 
An oft-cited example of the effect of these changes provides the 
clearest depiction of the consequences of sentence escalation. The 
example originated in a paper by Troy Stabenow.112 In his paper, 
Stabenow compares hypothetical defendants.113 Defendant #2114 is 
convicted of possession of child pornography.115 Stabenow provides 
the following characteristics for Defendant #2: 
Possessed a picture depicting a child under the age of twelve 
Used a computer to obtain the image 
Had one disk containing two movie files and ten pictures, equating 
to 160 pictures 
 [H]as no criminal history and has never abused or exploited a 
child. 
[P]leads guilty in a timely fashion and receives the maximum 
standard reduction for acceptance of responsibility116 
Depending upon when Defendant #2 was convicted, his sentence 
range would be as follows: 
April 30, 1987: No punishment—not illegal 
November 1, 1991: 6–12 months 
November 27, 1991: 12–18 months 
November 1, 1996: 21–27 months 
April 30, 2003: 30–37 months 
November 1, 2004: 41–51 months117 
                                                                                                                   
 
computer +2; (b)(6) If A) 10–150 images +2; B) 150–300 +3; C) 
300–600 +4 D) 600+ +5. 
Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 26–30. 
113 Id. 
114 Defendant #1 is charged with distribution of child pornography and is thus not 
relevant to this discussion. 
115 Stabenow, supra note 109, at 28. 
116 Id. at 28 (omitting the percent of typical defendants represented). 
117 Id. at 29. 
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By comparison, Stabenow then considers the federal sentence 
guidelines for a hypothetical physical offender.118 The physical 
offender is a fifty-year-old man who meets a thirteen-year-old girl on 
the Internet and successfully persuades her to meet him and have 
sex.119 “[T]he Guideline range for this Category I offender would be 
37–46 months.”120 
Observe the stunning difference between the crimes and the 
punishments. Defendant #2 has not committed a physical sex offense 
involving a minor. The fifty-year-old man has. Both crimes are sex 
crimes against minors. Both offenders are charged, convicted, and 
sentenced under the federal guidelines. Defendant #2, however, 
receives a greater sentence than the physical offender.121 
IV. EXPANDING PRETRIAL DIVERSION TO ADDRESS POSSESSION OF 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Today, under federal law and all state laws, possession of child 
pornography generally results in a felony conviction, incarceration for 
up to ten years, and mandatory registration as a sex offender for at 
least fifteen years.122 There is no doubt that a felony conviction and 
registration as a sex offender, even at the lowest level, curtails one’s 
ability to live and work.123The inability to find a job, and the fact that a 
sex offender must carefully choose where to live and monitor with 
whom he or she associates, forces many registered sex offenders to 
live in increased isolation and arguably results in a return to the online 
behavior that led to the initial conviction.124 




120 Stabenow, supra note 109, at 29. 
121 Id. (emphasis added). 
122 State Statutes—Child Pornography Possession, supra note 61, (noting that the 
maximum sentence for possession at the federal level has been increased since 
Stabenow’s report); Id. at 96, (also noting that possession combined with, e.g., 
prior offenses carries a minimum ten year sentence and a maximum twenty year 
sentence). 
123 See Hamilton, supra note 107, at 563–64. 
124 See Ethel Quayle et. al., Sex Offenders, Internet Child Abuse Images and 
Emotional Avoidance: The Importance of Values, 11 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR 1 (2006) (providing that often those using child pornography do so 
because of isolation or underlying addiction, depression issues). 
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Perhaps many of the offenders charged with possession of child 
pornography should be so restricted.125 But what about the nineteen-
year-old boy who goes off to college and for the first time acquires 
unfettered Internet access?126 Should he be branded with a felony 
conviction for the rest of his life and the label of sex offender until he 
is in his late thirties?127 Or like a similarly situated nineteen-year-old 
drug offender, should he be considered for further evaluation and 
possible treatment in lieu of prosecution? 
A. Risk and Needs Assessment 
To qualify for a pretrial diversion program, the offender must 
demonstrate certain eligibility.128 Eligibility generally depends upon 
the nature of the offense and can include the risk of recidivism and the 
identification of viable rehabilitation services.129 For example, Miami 
Dade County diverts drug offenders to a drug court system that 
manages the pretrial program.130 An offender qualifies for drug court 
in Dade County if he has no history of violent crime, has no prior 
arrests for drug sales or trafficking, and has no more than two previous 
                                                 
 
125 For example, if a possessor of child pornography is an active trader in child 
pornography, he will likely fail many of the risk tests that are used today to 
determine likelihood of reoffending. Troy Stabenow, A Method for Careful 
Study: A Proposal for Reforming the Child Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 108, 116 (2011). Similarly, an offender who is likely to reoffend 
will not generally be a candidate for pretrial probation. See supra Part II.C. 
126 Because high schools are permitted to restrict Internet access and most parents 
have put Internet filtering in place at home, most young men and women first 
experience unrestricted Internet access at university. See Children’s Internet 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2012) (restricting funding to public primary 
and secondary schools who do not filter harmful material from the Internet); 
Amanda Lenhart, Protecting Teens Online, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 
1, 7–8 (March 17, 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Report
.pdf (finding over fifty-four percent of parents used internet filters in the home 
in 2005, predicting growth to sixty-five percent by 2009). 
127 Or, perhaps age forty because getting to trial or even to a pretrial plea bargaining 
can sometimes take years. 
128 Id. at 12. 
129 Id. at 24. 
130 See supra Part II.C. 
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non-drug-related felony convictions.131 Similarly, the Essex County 
Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) in New Jersey considers all 
offenders charged with criminal or penal offenses except those with 
minor violations likely to result in a suspended sentence.132 However, 
New Jersey’s PTI program excludes those who have previously been 
diverted, or convicted, and those currently serving parole or 
probation.133 
When considering offenders charged with possession of child 
pornography, eligibility may be divided into two areas of 
consideration—general eligibility and specific eligibility. General 
eligibility would be based on facts similar to those of the Miami Dade 
drug court and New Jersey PTI program.134 The general eligibility 
would be a threshold condition. If an offender does not satisfy these 
general conditions, he or she cannot be considered for the option. 
Specific eligibility would rely upon a psychological determination 
of an offender’s ability to be accepted into, and respond positively to, 
treatment. In Massachusetts, for example, a district court judge may 
refer a candidate for diversion to the director of a program.135 The 
director of the program has fourteen days to perform an analysis of the 
defendant and provide a report to determine if the candidate will be 
able to benefit from the services.136 
                                                 
 
131 Miami Dade County Drug Works, Who is Eligible for Drug Court, MIAMI-DADE 
COUNTY DRUG COURT, http://www.miamidrugcourt.com/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54. 
132 New Jersey Courts, Pre Trial Intervention Program, http://www.judiciary.state.
nj.us/criminal/crpti.htm (last visited May 9, 2014). 
133 Id. 
134 Supra notes 131–32. Note that the Miami Dade and New Jersey examples, as 
well as the examples given above, in supra Part II.C, are illustrative of the 
numerous programs available. This Note proposes that each jurisdiction should 
use the eligibility criteria it already has in place. 
135 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276A, § 5 (2012). Under Massachusetts General Laws 
Chapter 276A a program is defined as including, but not limited to, “medical, 
educational, vocational, social and psychological services, corrective and 
preventive guidance, training, performance of community service work, 
counseling, provision for residence in a halfway house or other suitable place, 
and other rehabilitative services designed to protect the public and benefit the 
individual.” Id. at § 1. 
136 Id. 
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When considering possession of child pornography, the issue 
becomes whether there is a way to perform risk assessment evaluations 
that can be associated with treatment. This is a controversial issue. 
There is a “moral panic about the sexual exploitation of children”137 
that has been the driving force behind the severe penalties for those 
convicted of possession of child pornography.138 One author referred 
to this as punishment by proxy.139 Because of the public’s fear of those 
who physically harm children, society treats those who view such acts 
as equally culpable and punishes them accordingly.140 The flames of 
fear were further fueled by an oft-cited and provocatively titled study 
published in 2006.141 The study indicated that possession of child 
pornography was a valid indicator of the likelihood to commit future 
physical crimes against children.142 The primary author of that report, 
however, continued his research and published a series of follow-up 
analyses.143 The author has more recently reported that “the research 
has shown that relatively few child pornography offenders go on to 
commit sexual offenses, that are detected by authorities.”144 In fact, 
current scientific evidence taken from multiple studies linking 
possession of child pornography to physical child molestation shows: 
Child pornography consumption sometimes correlates to 
pedophilia, and many child pornography consumers report a past 
history of abuse (i.e., dual offending histories). However, child 
pornography consumption on its own does not appear to correlate 
to a significant risk that an offender will progress to a contact 
offense or recidivate generally post-conviction. Overall recidivism 
                                                 
 
137 Hamilton, supra note 107, at 547. 
138 Supra Part II.B. 
139 Hamilton, supra note 107, at 548. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Michael C. Seto et. al., Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid 
Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610 (Aug. 
2006). 
142 Id. 
143 See, e.g., Angela W. Eke, Michael C. Seto, & Jennette Williams, Examining the 
Criminal History and Future Offending of Child Pornography Offenders: An 
Extended Prospective Follow-up Study, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 466, 472 
(2011). 
144 Michael C. Seto, Assessing the Risk Posed by Child Pornography Offenders, 2 
G8 GLOBAL SYMPOSIUM AT THE UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL 
(2009), available at http://txn.fd.org/Seto_Position_Paper.pdf. 
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rates are very low across all demographics for these offenses, 
although offenders with prior criminal histories are more likely to 
recidivate, as are those with concurrent violent offenses (including 
contact sexual offenses) to their child pornography crimes. 
Overall, child pornography offenders appear to be far more 
compliant with supervision than other offender populations, and 
recidivism rates for offenders on supervision or in treatment are 
particularly low.145 
If the real risk that possessors of child pornography will escalate to 
become physical offenders is low, then the next question is whether 
there is a way to assess an individual offender’s risk to reoffend. The 
answer to this question is yes. Tests have long been established and 
accepted by law enforcement and the courts to determine a sex 
offender’s attraction to children.146 Many jurisdictions have 
established mandatory testing for sex offenders that determine their 
eligible for release after incarceration.147 
General eligibility criteria for entry into pretrial probation exist. 
Consistent and recent research indicates that offenders who have 
possessed child pornography are not at risk to escalate to child abuse. 
To ensure individual offenders are not a threat, existing risk 
assessment protocols used to evaluate sex offenders can be used. No 
risk assessment hurdle exists to prevent these offenders from being 
considered for pretrial diversion. 
B. Services 
Successful diversion programs marry services with treatment.148 
Drug and alcohol offenders who enter pretrial diversion programs are 
generally compelled to attend substance abuse treatment, mental health 
                                                 
 
145 Stabenow, supra note 109, at 121(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
146 See, e.g., Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment (June 30, 2006), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45355 
(suggesting six different tests); Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction, Best Practices Tool-Kit: Sex Offender Assessment and Treatment 
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Sex Offenders: Practices in Washington State (June 2008), http://www
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Washington for both juvenile and adult sex offenders). 
147 See id. 
148 Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 13. 
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treatment, and counseling.149 Some special diversion programs 
targeted at veterans also provide job and education services as well.150 
Treatment is designed to address the root cause of the offense in light 
of the offender’s needs and demographics—in short, to ensure 
success.151 
Programs for treating convicted sex offenders exist today.152 Often 
they involve counseling and cognitive behavior therapy.153 Generally, 
the same types of post-release counseling that have been available and 
provided to date can be used in a pretrial diversion setting. Treatment 
opportunities are also expanding. Accepting, arguendo, that the vast 
majority of offenders obtain child pornography via the Internet,154 an 
issue that has been greatly discussed is the legitimacy of Internet 
addiction, otherwise known as Internet abuse disorder.155 Viewed with 
mixed feelings by clinicians and the media,156 Internet abuse disorder 
appears to be emerging as a legitimate psychiatric concern.157 The fifth 
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150 See, e.g., Kate Cahoy, Jon Fougner, Sofia Nelson, & Eric Parrie, SB 114: 
IMPROVING PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION TO MEET THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF 
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154 G. Patrick Black & Kenneth R. Hawk, II, Computer Crimes & 
Computer/Internet Based Child Pornography Crimes, DEFN’DR SERVS. OFFICE 
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http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/WS2012/Computer_Crimes101.pdf (noting that child 
pornography saw a resurgence that started in the 1990s due to online access). 
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addictions because there is no chemical dependency), with Blake R. Bertagna, 
Internet—Disability or Distraction? An Analysis of Whether “Internet 
Addiction” Can Qualify as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 419 (2008) (arguing that Internet addiction 
should be recognized by the Americans with Disability Act). 
157 See generally American Psychiatric Association, supra note 156. 
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edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) is scheduled for release in May 
2013.158 The DSM-V lists “Internet use disorder” in the section 
dedicated to areas which have been recommended for “further study 
before they should be considered disorders . . . [in order to] encourage 
research on the condition.”159 Presumably, inclusion in the DSM-V 
can be expected to result in more specific treatments targeted at 
Internet abuse by viewers of child pornography. 
As with risk assessments, treatment programs are in place and in 
use by the courts and probation departments for post-release treatment. 
New, more targeted, treatments may not be far behind. An inability to 
provide treatment programs for offenders is not an obstacle to 
providing pretrial diversion for child pornography possessors. 
C. Supervision 
Successful pretrial diversion programs require supervision.160 
Pretrial diversion is a second chance and, given that opportunity, the 
offender is required to follow the terms of his diversion. Supervision 
ensures the terms of the diversion are being met.161 Depending upon 
the offence, supervision may entail random drug screens, verification 
of attendance at treatment programs, and the offender “checking in” 
regularly with the supervising officer. 
Existing pretrial diversion programs often provide supervision 
through a jurisdiction’s probation office or pre-trial service 
agencies.162 As it pertains to possession of child pornography, the 
supervision will include utilization of resources that are already in 
place—meetings with the supervisory officer, verification that 
treatment is occurring, and confirmation that other conditions of the 
diversion are being met.163 There is no doubt that additional resources 
will be needed to supervise the increased number of diverted 
offenders, but the costs of adding those resources can be covered by 
                                                 
 
158 See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
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the overall savings in other areas.164 Indeed, the savings discussed in 
supra II-D included the costs of additional probation resources. 
There are no significant barriers to providing supervision to 
offenders charged with possession of child pornography. Indeed, of the 
three items discussed in this section, providing supervision should be 
the least difficult. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Pretrial diversion is an option available throughout the country for 
low-risk offenders who can benefit from treatment. It provides those 
offenders with an opportunity to turn themselves around, rather than 
face incarceration and the stigma of a conviction. It is a successful and 
cost-effective alternative to incarceration for those offenders who meet 
the requirements. 
Possession of child pornography is a sex offense and, therefore, 
defendants charged with possession of child pornography are not 
eligible for pretrial diversion. This stems in part from the public’s fear 
of child abuse and the belief that those who are viewing the abuse are 
either as morally culpable as those who perform it, or are also capable 
of becoming a physical offender. This over-inclusive view results in 
harsh sentencing guidelines at the federal level. In many cases, 
possessors of child pornography are incarcerated for longer periods of 
time than those who actually abused the child. The result is that all 
possessors risk not only a felony conviction, but also face registration 
as a sex offender for a minimum of fifteen years. 
Studies indicate, however, that defendants accused of possession of 
child pornography are potentially successful subjects for diversion. 
They generally meet the guidelines regarding prior offenses and age. 
Risk assessment is currently available, as is treatment. Apart from 
society’s repugnance of the crime and its fears of what these offenders 
represent, or theoretically may do, there is arguably no reason not to 
consider them for pretrial diversion. 
                                                 
 
164 See supra Part II.D and discussion therein. 
